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THE STRATEGY OF COMMUNIST-DIRECTED INSURGENCY AND THE CONDUCT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

A lecture delivered at the Naval War College

by

Dr. Michael C. Conley

on 28 October 1968

Let me address myself to two subjects during the next hour. First, I wish to propose a definition or a precept of what insurgency is, and then, secondly, I would say something about the essential requirements of a meaningful response to it. My attention here is directed particularly toward the Communist-dominated or influenced insurgency, but some of what I say would apply to other forms as well.

Essential Strategic Factors in the Conduct of Insurgency. Perhaps the best way to get at the subject of insurgency is to differentiate between three distinct periods during the insurgent process: (1) that moment at which it may be said that an insurgency exists, (2) at the other end of the spectrum, that moment when it may be said that the insurgent process has been completed if it is allowed to run full length, and (3) the intervening interval between the point of departure and the consummation of the phenomenon. To turn to the first of

these moments, I will argue here that an insurgent condition may be said to exist in all or a portion of a country as of the moment when three essential requirements have been satisfied.

First, there is present a body of men, trained and disciplined, who engage in

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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subversion as a profession. I would suggest that in the absence of that organization it is improper to speak of insurgency. Secondly, that body of men engage in activity at both the overt, or legal, and at the clandestine, or illegal, level. Lenin, at the commencement of the 20th century, spoke of a "legal/illegal" apparatus. We may better refer to it today as the overt/clandestine party organization. It operates at both levels. Where no definitive body of law exists, as is the case in some modernizing countries, the party may technically not be breaking the law, but in such a setting it will engage in the equivalent by acting contrary to custom. Third, that body of men engage relentlessly in getting a message out to the civil population, an ideology if possible, a body of slogans derived from an ideology in any case. The intent of that message will be to justify the illegal activities in which the body of professionals engage on the basis of some so-called higher law.

All three of these requirements, I would argue, are indispensable in the determination of when precisely the insurgent process may be said to have begun. In the absence of point three, as an example, you are dealing with the criminal, not the insurgents. When intelligence operations indicate that these three requirements have been met in a country or any portion thereof, then one can no longer act in the context of preventive insurgency. To the extent that the armed forces of that country have a counterinsurgent mission, they should become operational as of that moment. You do not wait until the guerrilla has popped up, for he may never pop up!

The phrases "incipient" or "latent" insurgency are unfortunately popular and widespread. If one insists upon employing those terms I would say they refer to the period of time before these three requirements have been met. Once

they have been met, it is no longer incipient.

Now, of course, these are only minimum requirements. The process can intensify beyond this point by taking recourse to any of three alternate general strategies. These strategies may be identified, using Communist terminology, as the United Front from Below, Right strategy, and Left strategy. It is a matter of crucial importance that one understand the essential strategic intent behind each of these alternate forms of insurgency. One must likewise understand, however, that an insurgency can switch from one of these strategies to another during its course. Let us take a look at each of these alternate strategies in succession.

The first of them, the United Front from Below, is also known as the "Four Class" or "War of National Liberation" approach. It is that form of insurgency which obtains presently in South Vietnam but which has also occurred in many other countries. Let me attempt to get at the essential strategy involved here with the simplified diagram shown in figure 1. The box to the upper right identifies a modernizing country's national executive. Beneath it we suggest the administrative hierarchy of government which may or, quite possibly, may not perform those regulatory and supporting functions for the mass of the indigenous citizenry suggested by the box to the lower right. Parallel to this structure of government we set a front within which the hierarchy of professional subversives is embedded, sheltered from public view, but free to determine the content of the front's public pronouncements and the direction of its activities. The task to be accomplished through the front is to make the nation's population act as though the front was a real government, not the *de jure* administration in office. The presumption of the insurgent is that if he persists in this venture long




Fig. 1--The strategy of the United Front from Below

enough, the people will begin to act as if the front is indeed the real government, whereupon it can displace the traditional government on a de facto basis. The traditional government is not destroyed as such, rather it becomes--and this is the crucially important word--irrelevant! You don't destroy it, you make it irrelevant, you displace it, and to speed up this process you employ the last element depicted in figure 1, armed force. Its task is (1) to place the civil population under duress, speeding up its reorientation towards the parallel shadow government; and (2) break such communications between the government and the civil population as may have previously existed.

You will notice that there are three crucially important parallel structures within the insurgent organization when it employs United Front from Below strategy. In a more systematized model they may be indicated as in figure 2. Indispensable to this form of insurgent strategy, once fully elaborated, are (1) the party of subversives who engage in revolution as a profession--the party apparatus down the center of the diagram; (2) the armed elements which it employs to speed up the process of reorganizing the civil population; and (3) the civil structure, the front, into which the citizenry are organized as the insurgency proceeds. At the conclusion of the insurgent process the civil organization is slated to become the new government of the country.

In South Vietnam this civil organization, of course, is known as the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN), while the military force is rather crudely referred to as the Viet Cong in popular American journalism. The party apparatus, finally, is the Dang Lao Dong, or, to use the Vietnamese Communists' own terminology south of the 17th parallel, the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP). This structure in its South Vietnam form is, in somewhat greater detail, suggested in

figure 3.¹ All three of these structures must be present when the insurgent has recourse to this form of insurgency. The structure produced is a threefold and not a twofold organization. When we identify the insurgent organization in South Vietnam as the Viet Cong/National Front, and fail to name those who run the show, we are engaging in a fundamental misnaming of the phenomenon with which we are confronted.

It is unfortunately one of the traditional characteristics of American study in the field of insurgency not to adequately identify the crucial body as the center of the phenomenon. When we were studying the Greek insurgents, we talked about the military forces of ELAS; we talked about the front--the EAM--but nobody said KKE, the Greek Communist Party. When we studied the Malayan insurgency, everyone identified the Min Yuen, which is the counterpart of the civil organization in a state of only partial elaboration, and it is easy enough to equate the CT's (Communist Terrorists) with the Viet Cong. But nobody said Malayan Communist Party. Uniformly, since the Americans took up the study of insurgency, in that form which we know as the United Front from Below, the central column in our diagrams has tended to be ignored. How can we build good counterinsurgency doctrine on a conceptual structure which misses the strategic center of the threat?

The United Front from Below is only one of three alternate strategies available for the escalation of an insurgency. The second one has been called Right strategy; this term has frequently been employed in Communist literature to

¹U.S. Dept of the Army, *The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: a Study of Organization and Strategy* by Michael C. Conley, DOA Pam. 550-106 (Washington: 1967). (Also found in Defense Documentation Center, AD 655-506/7).




Figure 2




Figure 3

identify this alternate ploy. The classic use of Right strategy occurs with the insurgents' participation in a coalition government. We would visualize the thrust of the insurgents' effort in figures 4 and 5. In the first of these diagrams, several of the ministers with portfolio in the government of a modernizing country are suggested together with the member parties to the coalition who put them in office. The Liberal Populists have provided the Minister of Economics within the coalition government; the Christian Socialists, the Prime Minister; the National Democrats, the Foreign Minister. The Party of Revolt, controlled by the insurgent apparatus, has also provided several persons. The Minister of Education, as an example, might come from the Party of Revolt. If they can carry it off at all, the Agriculture and Interior Ministers will come from the Party of Revolt.

The initial declarations issued by the Party of Revolt during the period when the coalition is being formed will fall in the general category of: We are simply one more of the left-oriented, reforming parties in country; shoulder to shoulder with other progressive forces in country, we will work to assure our country a brilliant future in a brave new world. The final coalition, once established, is indeed a genuine coalition government. Then a series of events of the following order will occur, stretched possibly over several years. The Minister of Economics arises one day in the deliberative assembly and calls for a new law which will make \$1.75 the minimum wage for an hour's work. Immediately, a member of the Party of Revolt stands up in the deliberative assembly and argues that nothing less than \$2.25 will do. And then, turning to the larger electorate outside the deliberative assembly, he asks, "And you, liberal populists, who are your true friends? The Minister of Economics or we of the Party of Revolt?"

The intent here is to progressively compromise and make impossible the position held by the Minister of Economics. Eventually, frustrated, he resigns from the government. There is a very serious question of who will fill the new post, conflict develops within the Liberal Populist Party. An opposition group breaks off, but a collaborating faction is prepared to go along with the remainder of the coalition government, and a man who is amenable to manipulation by the Party of Revolt takes over the position of Minister of Economics. Then, one day, the Foreign Minister is found in a compromising position in the red light district of town. Photographs are taken, but rather than use them for blackmail, they are immediately published in the newspapers. The Foreign Minister denies that the pictures are of him. They must have been taken of someone else who looks very much like him. When his explanation fails to win wide acceptance, he resigns to display his integrity; and the Prime Minister, supporting him to the hilt, tenders his resignation to demonstrate the integrity of his government as a whole. Fragmentation occurs once again in the parties of the coalition. But men amenable to the Party of Revolt fill the new slots in the coalition in which suddenly there are nothing but communists and their followers! The insurgent has won. And that victory is just as real as if he had done it with guerrillas. Now he can begin the physical liquidation of his public opponents. See figure 5.

Why is it so crucially important for us to understand that this also is insurgency? Consider the discussion currently of a possible coalition government in South Vietnam. We Americans will be inclined to say--if such a solution is accepted--"Fine, the war is over." But the Communist will say, "Those foolish Americans. Now we can move faster than before." The Dang Lao Dong would not stop its struggle; it would




Fig. 4—Right insurgent strategy




Fig. 5--Right insurgent strategy

merely switch strategies. The goal--the seizure of political power in Saigon itself--would not change.

The third strategy mentioned above is Left strategy, once again a term repeatedly employed in Communist literature. This is the least important of the three alternate strategies, but it has succeeded on occasion and consequently deserves a moment's attention. Left strategy is the strategy of the true believer who has performed an act of faith and believes, as an example, in Karl Marx's dialectical materialistic interpretation of man's history. He may believe that the Communist is the vanguard of progress, the wave of the future. Characteristic for the true believer is the conviction that the ultimate revolution against capitalism lies in the immediate future. He need only go out in the streets, declare the commencement of the revolution, and the masses--so he convinces himself--will rush to join him, forming columns of selfless patriots of the working class who throw themselves against the defenses of the government. After a brief period of street fighting, he believes, the seizure of power can be successfully completed and the new regime established. Left strategy, then, calls for the least amount of prior organizational work; it tends to see the city as the crucial theater of operations and expects victory to be but days or weeks away. We are dealing here, clearly, with that form of insurgency in which the counterinsurgent can make the largest number of mistakes and still win.

The United Front from Below, Right strategy, and Left strategy, then, are the three alternate strategies which may be employed to escalate an insurgency from the minimum requirements previously suggested. The consummation of the process, finally, comes with the seizure of political power nationwide. And this phrase, "political power," should be stressed, for this whole phenomenon is, first off, a political process,

not a military one. Where and how armed force will be employed is determined by a preeminently political command structure.

At this juncture then, we are prepared to pose a definition--or better, a description--for the term "subversive insurgency," to wit:

A subversive insurgency is a political struggle within a single country directed by a disciplined cellularly structured party that has the abilities to (1) exploit the dissidence in being in a country to embed itself politically within the population, (2) conduct illegal operations (or activities which conflict with social convention where an elaborated legal code is lacking) in addition to such overt and legal work as it may perform, and (3) relentlessly propagandize the populace with a political platform or ideology that justifies its activities. The party organization, in intensifying its threat, will adjust its propaganda activities and extra-party support organization structure, during any given period in its struggle, to conform with the imperatives of one of three alternate grand strategies (Left, Right or United Front from Below). Excepting cases where the first of these general lines is used, the party will conceive of its operations as occurring within a protracted time frame, and it will attempt to make the multiple forms of struggle in which it engages (those appropriate to the strategy selected and the domestic conditions obtaining) the essential means through which it progressively comes to dominate the political fabric of the society in which it is active. The period of the insurgency closes with the seizure of the instruments of political power in the country by the party organization, displacing the original government and its indigenous socioeconomic underpinnings with a restructured society organized to assure longevity to the new regime. The insurgent is under no obligation to stick permanently to any one of his alternate strategies during the

period of protracted political struggle. Indeed, if one studies the history of any Communist Party during any period in its history since the 1920's, it becomes readily apparent that it has jumped around from one strategy to another. Consider, as an example, the Yugoslav Communist during the World War Two period. The insurgency tended to start Left in 1941 (particularly in Montenegro and Serbia). It went United Front from Below in 1942 and 1943, entered into a Right strategy with the Subasic government-in-exile briefly in 1944, and turned toward the Left again in 1945.

Let me add yet one last facet to the discussion here of strategy. I am particularly concerned now with the two lines of United Front from Below and Right. In this context a word must be said about mass organizational work. The building of mass organizations is no helter-skelter affair. There are clearly apparent procedures for going about this activity. First off, what is a mass organization? I suggest the following formulation:

An officially freely established association of persons who either serve a common ideological principle or seek to effect articulated socioeconomic aims through integrated activity. (The criteria for membership may be determined by age, sex, profession, or place of residence.)

A PTA could be turned into a fine mass organization, but likewise a military unit, an agency of government, or a reading circle.

To indicate the fashion in which mass organizations are controlled, let us take a historical example from India from a peasant organization of the 1940's known as the Kisan Sabhas. The phenomenon briefly considered here is suggested in figure 6. The peasant organization in question was structured after the fashion of a territorial hierarchy, it will be seen, prior to its penetration by the Indian Communist Party (ICP). Starting at the bottom,

fractions derived from cells of the ICP penetrated the primary bodies of the future mass organization. At this point, command channels are clear. The Politburo of the party (or the Presidium of the party, depending upon the tactical terminology of the moment) provides direction down through the province and district committees to the locally operating cell.

When it became possible to penetrate the Kisan Sabhas at higher levels, however, command channels altered. The chain of command was from the Politburo to the province committee, as an example, and then to the province committee's own fraction inside the provincial body of the Kisan Sabhas. This latter body, the province fraction, acquired operation control over all other fractions within the province in which it was active. This meant that a distinct hierarchy of agents, parallel to the party itself, had been set up.

Once the All-India Kisan Sabhas executive offices were penetrated, this hierarchy of activists paralleled the ICP proper from top to bottom. The fraction at the All-India level acquired operational control over all subordinate fractions throughout the country. Policy, however, was made in the Politburo. The superordinate fraction did not make policy; its sole task was the supervision of implementation. This is a brilliant example of administrative streamlining. With respect to the Kisan Sabhas the party organization of the ICP at the province, district, and cell levels becomes the logistic base upon which the fractions call in the implementation of orders received from above through clandestine channels maintained within the mass organization itself. Such managerial skill in the building of control lines is one of the distinctive characteristics of the subversive "pro."

A still higher form of organization occurs when two or more mass organizations of the order just described are




Fig. 6-Command structure of Communist Party of India in a peasant mass organization

bound together by providing them with a common executive committee. Such a complex is referred to, technically, in Communist literature as a "front," that is to say, the words "front" and "mass" organization should not be used as interchangeable. If one wishes to be precise, he should take care to observe this distinction when working in this subject area.

A moment's reflection upon the nature of mass organizations in federation, under a single executive Committee, makes it readily apparent that the so-called National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) is nothing more than a complex of mass organizations bound together by a national executive council. Clearly, this body does not run the show; it is simply the mouthpiece through which the party of "pro's" reaches out to the public at large.

The principles of mass organization work touched upon briefly to this point are crucially important, not only to the United Front from Below approach, but also to Right strategy. In both cases the insurgent must build mass organizations as a first priority order of business. An inability to perform this kind of work is a clear indication of one of two possible situations. Either the subversive political leadership is amateur, or the counter-insurgent is indeed doing his job correctly! In Cuba the counterinsurgent was not effective, but Castro was likewise an amateur. He did not have an effective political command until the Cuban Communist Party came over to him, providing him with the administrative know-how indispensable to the insurgent process.

In the light of what I have said thus far, I would suggest that the most important thing you can say about a Communist insurgent in a single sentence is this: He is, par excellence, an administrator of revolution! He is a revolutionary bureaucrat. Remarkable! Without precedent prior to the 20th

century. Organizational know-how lies at the heart of his competence, and verily I say: it is organizational know-how that must underlie our response to him. But this will remain impossible until we begin to work from a different conceptual base. More on this presently.

Yet another word in the general subject area. It is popular to draw a distinction between a Peking form of insurgency and a Moscow form of insurgency. And some people even add a Yugoslav form and so on and so on. It is my considered opinion--and nothing but that--on the basis of the evidence available to me that these popular distinctions are meaningless, that there is, in fact, no such thing as a peculiarly Peking or "oriental" approach or a unique Moscow approach. *There is only a Communist approach.* The conflict between Moscow and Peking centers around the following question: Should we go United Front from Below or Right? It is entirely possible for either party to use either line. However, while fighting with one another regarding the choice as to strategic line, neither Peking nor Moscow are asking whether one should or should not utilize mass organization.

Now Moscow happens to think today that the professional subversive should go Right. And Peking thinks the later 1960's are better suited for the United Front from Below.

A very real issue is at stake here, for if Peking, as an example, could actually provoke the majority of international Communist Parties to go United Front from Below, it would necessarily serve as a reflection of Moscow's de facto subordination to the will of Peking's leadership. However, the choice of strategies supported by either center at any given historic moment is altogether transitory. There have been periods when Moscow went United Front from Below and denounced the use of Right strategy as heresy. I cannot take the time here to recount in detail the

number of times this has happened, but let me assure you it has. And Peking has gone Right many times. There is clear-cut historical evidence of this as well. There is nothing about the Peking experience which obliges her uniformly to pursue the strategy of the United Front from Below into the indefinite future. Both countries use that specific line that best suits their external and internal interests at any given moment, denouncing the other strategies, as necessary, as heresy. Truth is a temporal matter, a function of tactics.

That Moscow should favor extensive negotiations today between us and the North Vietnamese, together with the creation of an allegedly neutral coalition government in Saigon, dovetails neatly with the policies of Right strategy which she is employing currently in Western Europe. There is nothing particularly unique in her desire to pursue in Asia that strategy which she is employing in many other parts of the globe. Nor does this mean she seeks genuine peace. All she wants is that the insurgent follow guidance that jibes with the Kremlin's assessment of its own best interests. I think the problem is just that simple.

Responding to the Insurgent Administrator. Now let me turn my attention to the subject of how one responds to this phenomenon. With the possible exception of those moments when the insurgent uses Left strategy, I would argue here that the essential genius of the insurgent process is its effort through time to make the government of the country under attack irrelevant to its own citizenry. Above all else, the insurgent is intent upon displacing the legal authority of the moment with an alternate authority which he controls. That new authority, of course, is the parallel shadow government in one strategic setting or the member party to a coalition government in the most probable alternate setting. In either case the

structure in question is the front within which the party's political command structure is embedded. Under both dispensations the insurgent is engaged in displacing the government first of all; the killing of persons and the destruction of buildings and supplies is of second-order importance. The guerrilla --one of the insurgent's weapon systems --impressed us Americans, however, to the point that we have come to conceive of insurgency as a war of attrition between opposing irregular/regular military forces. In point of fact, nothing could be farther from the truth! That is not what it is about. And if we insist upon perceiving the problem in this way, it is only because of our own conceptual inadequacy.

More relevant is the following proposition: To the extent that displacing civil authority is at the strategic heart of the insurgent process, so must the displacing of the insurgent's alternate political structure lie at the strategic heart of counterinsurgency. Your task is to displace the insurgency, and you do that by underwriting a better revolution to which you are morally committed because you are American or you are an allied officer of a free world country and for which we have the materiel requirement because we have the greatest productivity the world has ever seen. You displace the insurgency; you make it uninteresting; you compete at the grassroots to take those mass organizations away from him. It is only to the extent that he has those mass organizations available to him that he is capable of providing himself with guerrillas (if he decides to use them), intelligence, and supplies. If you can take those mass organizations away from him with a better revolution, he loses. If you choose not to respond at this level, then you will pour larger amounts of money and heavier and heavier commitments of men into a war which you will lose because you strategically do not understand what you are involved in.

The essential task of counterinsurgency is to give the peasant or the urban dweller good, solid, hard, selfish reasons as to why he would prefer your side. That's what it is about. And the sense of a military operation is that it facilitates either (1) establishing contact with that miserable peasant so you can make your offer known, or (2) pursuing that contract once established. A military operation that cannot be justified on one of these two counts should never be permitted to occur.

Now, I don't mean that in any narrow sense. Obviously, if you have good, solid intelligence to the effect that, say, a battalion-size unit is moving in the direction of a populated area in which you are heavily involved, then it is your obligation for political reasons to prevent it from moving any further. It's self-evident that if it gets into the area in which you are operating, it's going to inhibit any positive effort you make among the populace. I'm not suggesting for a moment that you don't need military force. Of course you do. But the "why" is the important thing. The military force is there to guarantee the political process. And every military operation should be planned with that as the paramount consideration. Until you have decided what you are going to do with the civilians that you reach by a military operation, it is senseless to carry it out. And until you have the capabilities of performing among that civil population the task which you have decided to perform, you don't initiate the operation. Now these are indispensable prerequisites if counterinsurgency is to be understood as displacing insurgency. This conclusion follows invariably from my precept or definition, if you will, of what the insurgent process is. Only by showing that my definition is wrong can you reasonably, logically reject my line of argumentation here.

If you will permit me to continue the line of thought I am pursuing here, I

will assert, next, that the most important thing you have to know to engage in counterinsurgency is the characteristics of the population with which you must work. Now that population is not going to be a uniform, homogeneous body. You will run into every conceivable human condition as you move from one group of persons to the next. One needs a device, a kind of typology, for differentiating the characteristics of the population groups among which you are working. I suggest such a possible device with the schematic in figure 7.

Let me talk my way through this little diagram, step by step. I create a system of eight boxes-pigeonholes, if you will-in which I will place human groups by differentiating, on the one hand, between four different kinds of inner group authority structures which may obtain in a village, a hamlet. Do keep in mind that this typology is for the analysis of groups at this local level; I am not attempting to characterize whole nations as such, but rather the microcosm of groups of, say 50 to 500 who make up that nation when added together.

Within the hamlet there may be groups with authoritative structures that might be labeled "pluralistic." By this I mean that what the group does is determined by consensus. The group does thus and so because that is what most of the members want to do. "Atomistic," by contrast, refers to a situation in which you are not really dealing with a human group but with an accidental aggregate in which there is no arrangement for arriving at consensus. On the other side, "hierarchical" refers to a group in which the decisions of the group are imposed from above. "Hierarchical" may be used as a synonym for "autocratic." Finally, I add on a fourth type of authority structure labeled "totalitarian."

There is a popular belief to the effect that being totalitarian is simply being autocratic, but even more so. If you get




Fig. 7-Typology for the ordering of groups & aggregates

more and more autocratic, eventually you're totalitarian. I argue that this is not the case, that totalitarianism is fundamentally different than autocracy. In an autocratic system—and any military organization, as an example, is autocratic—the individual's initiative is circumscribed. He may work only within a formally established jurisdictional area. However, within that delimited field he is indeed expected to use his initiative. The efficiency ratings of the military or naval officer, as an example, are determined in part by how much initiative he employs within the restricted area in which he is to exercise his own discretion. This is likewise a historical characteristic of autocratic governments in general. It is apparent in 18th or 19th century Prussia, of Austria, and any other number of countries.

A totalitarian system, by contrast, duplicates functions. Thus, in the Soviet state one finds an economic bureau in the military hierarchy, in the party hierarchy, in the Komsomol apparatus, in the formal bureaucracy of government, et cetera. But more important than this is the fact that the personnel of each of these structures, performing precisely the same function, never really know whether their execution of an order from above is the one that counts or not. The result is a formlessness, a shapelessness, that is constantly reinforced and sustained. Such a system is altogether distinct from the situation customary in autocratic groups and organizations.²

²Those who would pursue this point in detail are encouraged to read the brilliant work of Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Meridian, 1960). Particularly important on the point at hand are chapters 11, "The Totalitarian Movement," and 12, "Totalitarianism in Power," p. 341-459. For an updating and a modification of many of Arendt's conclusions, see also Alex Inkeles, *Social Change in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968).

The second dimension in figure 7 involves the values that motivate group activities. What I am concerned with here is the "why" of working together as opposed to "what" they are doing. Why does the group engage in road-building? If the answer is, "Because tomorrow morning we will each get a dollar and a half pay," then the motivation is "instrumental." By "instrumental" I mean a concern with immediate pragmatic payoff.

But the response might be: "If not I, then my son, and if not my son, then my grandson will profit from what we do here today." If that is what I hear, then I'm dealing with a clearly transcendent motivation looking to a distant ill-defined future.

If these two dimensions are placed in just a position to one another as in figure 7, it produces a system of eight boxes. These are sufficient in number to permit meaningful differentiation, yet, at the same time, they are few enough so that one could actually utilize them in a battlefield situation. It is a realistic compromise between the extremities to which behavioral science might go and an oversimplification that would destroy purposeful differentiation.

In an initial attempt at establishing the utility of this device, a wide variety of groups are inserted into these eight boxes in figure 8. There may well be disagreement on the location of any specific group, but I am inclined to believe it will involve, on every occasion, only matters of degree. Thus, one might argue that major American political parties located in the instrumental pluralistic box, are in reality slightly further toward the hierarchical and the transcendent, but hardly anyone would counsel the complete relocation of the American party in a totally unrelated corner of the typology. Greater sophistication could be added, of course, by understanding the eight boxes to be not airtight compartments but relatively permeable locations along a spectrum of




Fig. 8--Typology for the ordering of groups & aggregates

infinitely variable possibilities. One pays a price, however, if he does this, for then the balance between differentiation and simplification is destroyed.

With this typology in mind, let us consider the issue of our impact as an example of Vietnamese society, particularly with the troop buildup after 1964. I would suggest that one of the characteristic effects of our operations in Vietnam has been to create aggregates that are Atomistic and instrumental. We move the population out of an area, bomb it thoroughly, stick the people behind barbed wire, and expect them to behave themselves. We are creating, in such a case, a body of people who belong to the right lower corner of the typology. The People's Revolutionary Party, or better the Dang Lao Dong, is more concerned with inducing a very different kind of movement which brings one to the next point I wish to make on the intent which must lie at the heart of counterinsurgency.

Consider in the context of this typology the subject treated earlier, mass organizational work. When the Dang Lao Dong engages in this activity, it is, from a social psychometric viewpoint, moving groups that are low and to the right, up and to the left. To engage in mass organization work, for the Communist, is to induce transcendent values and tight authority structure among civil groups that are possibly completely devoid of transcendent values and autocratic authority structure initially. Through mass work the party builds its following by drawing individuals into organizations where (1) controls from the top down may be progressively tightened, and (2) instrumental values can be displaced with transcendent values. The Communist seeks to move the individual from right to left along the horizontal axis of our matrix and from bottom to top along the vertical axis.

More important for our immediate purposes is the corollary to this general

theorem. Groups plotted in the right lower corner of the matrix are highly susceptible to a Communist Party's mass organizational effort, while groups located above and to the left of this position are less easily influenced, reaching near imperviousness in the upper left-hand corner.³ Before an organization may be fitted into the Communist Party's scheme of things, the dynamic process developed by others must be reversed, moving the group, so to speak, down and to the right, before it can be built up again in line with the functional requirements of the Communist Party. In this context, then, a transcendent/hierarchical group of a non-Communist order is less easily amalgamated with a Communist structure, than an instrumental/atomistic body which has yet to evolve its normative patterns.

Returning to the priorities for the conduct of counterinsurgent political work, we may assert that those groups assigned locations low and to the right constitute the most probable target groups of Communist mass organizational activities. To inhibit the growth of an insurgent support structure and/or oblige the agit/prop cadre to surface where it can be located and removed, these groups must be provided with the

³A number of cases of parallel transcendent totalitarian organizations with a single larger society have been provoked by the Sino-Soviet conflict, e.g., the Peking and Moscow oriented parties of India, Belgium, and a number of other countries. In each case, both Communist Party's would be plotted in category A of our matrix. Organizations in the proximity of the upper left corner tend to be vulnerable only at the level of their supreme leadership which could sell out. Such a development did occur in the Malaya Communist Party while Loi Tok was Secretary General. It should be noted, however, that the viability of that organization was not broken by this treachery. The transcendent values of the rank and file permitted the organizations not only to survive, but to recover quickly enough to provide leadership for the protracted guerrilla war of the later 1940's and early 1950's.

attributes of stable organizations. Where such organizations do not exist, they must be built. Where they lack structural sophistication or generate only instrumental commitment and low involvement, they must be strengthened or supplemented through the creation of complementary organizations. Transcendent content must be injected into their activities. Where hostile transcendent-oriented groups are identified (e.g., Communist-styled youth, women, labor, et cetera, "liberation" associations) an attempt must be made to alter these values or, failing this, parallel, government-oriented organizations with strongly transcendent values must be introduced and an attempt made to draw the rank and file membership of the hostile organization into the new competing structure.⁴

Counterinsurgency: The Summing Up.⁵ Embraced within the concept "counterinsurgency" are a multitude of concurrent programs conducted by a wide variety of organizations. Normally, each of these organizations has arisen historically in response to some specific need, and each has its own professional orientation toward the population at large and its own criteria for determining its proficiency. Under conditions of domestic tranquility, this is as it should be; faced with insurgency, however, there must be an integrating principle for measuring effectiveness, namely: the organizations' contribution to the political integration of the popula-

tion around viable organizations compatible with security needs!

This is not to suggest that the armed forces should give up marksmanship or tax officials the collection of taxes. What it does mean is that these activities cease to be ends in themselves and must be reevaluated for their contribution to the imperative of political integration. Marksmanship or tax collection are now adjudged important, not because they are traditional interests of persons belonging to these two respective agencies of government, but because marksmanship or fiscal consistency contribute to a public environment in which integrative activities are more likely to succeed. Again, this is not to counsel shortsightedness. For the military unit to drop its guard in order to engage in some newfangled program that obliges it to suffer casualties and to surrender its tactical dominance of a given region, as a result, is hardly intelligent behavior. Where the military domination of an area is the prerequisite for positive action and requires the soldier's full time, strictly military activities must constitute the extent of his contribution. It is only important that the strategist have foremost in his mind the central purpose of counterinsurgency which is sociopolitical, not military, and which revolves about the issue of providing a new identity for the individual who has broken free from traditional cultural patterns and finds himself in a rapidly changing environment.

Working from this frame of reference, the devising of concrete operations presupposes the resolution of two large problem areas. The counterinsurgent must be armed with detailed, precise knowledge of the area in which he is to operate, but, equally important, he must fully appreciate the potentials of the agencies through which he is to work and the possible alternate fashions in which they may be grouped together for their combined effect.

⁴These two alternate possible approaches may be understood as the government's strategic counterparts of the communist Right and United Front from Below general lines.

⁵For a more exhaustive treatment of the basic principles of counterinsurgency, see American University, Center for Research in Social Systems, *Building Social Viability in an Insurgent Environment: a Positive Strategy for Displacing Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam*, by Michael C. Conley (Washington: 1969).

Counterinsurgency conceived in this framework, then, is first and foremost a continuing, conscious effort at the integration of the populace through organizational work directed from the highest level of government and utilizing any and all agencies of state in behalf of its goal. To the extent that the individual is provided with an organizational identity inside a structure capable of engendering his loyalties and active participation, he is not available for recruitment by the insurgent. Where he has been compromised by the insurgent, he is offered the opportunity to alter his status by redirecting his loyalties to government-sponsored bodies. Such a

process must progressively weaken the insurgent by depriving him of his access to the civil population from which he draws recruits for his military and extra-military formations and in which he hides his political command structure. To initiate this work is to attack the problem of insurgency at its roots.

Counterinsurgency may be visualized then, broadly, as the complex of activities initiated and sustained by government through which organized groups are induced to support the government while the unorganized are progressively moved, one group after another, from the anonymity of proto-organizations to the stability of viable social groups.

Ψ

Communists . . . always seek to make use of their enemy and in the meantime take care not to be used by him.

Chiang Kai-shek, 1887-, Soviet Russia in China